What Is Wrong with America?

What are the reasons behind the current problems in the U.S., and can science provide answers? By following the ideas of Peter Turchin, the founder of cliodynamics, we come to a conclusion: elite overproduction and popular immiseration are likely causes of the crisis. But what does the future hold for the country?

It is now clear that the political situation in the U.S. has escalated beyond traditional partisan rivalry. Cultural wars, fierce polarization against political opponents, a lack of trust in the judicial and electoral systems, and the rise of radical factions within established political groups—these problems are raising concerns not only among Americans. Governments and ordinary people worldwide are observing the events with a mix of anxiety, cynicism, and even dark amusement. The U.S.'s status as a global hegemon means that any internal upheavals inevitably impact the international landscape—from trade wars and the erosion of globalization to the restructuring of military alliances and open conflicts.

So, what is really happening in the U.S.? Why has the country reached this point, and what lies ahead? Peter Turchin, the founder of cliodynamics—a field that applies scientific methods to analyze historical processes—explores these questions in his book End Times. Examining numerous state crises, from the Intermediate periods of Ancient Egypt and the Hundred Years' War to the Taiping Rebellion in China and the American Civil War, he identifies two main factors that lead to societal collapse: elite overproduction and popular immiseration.

Elite Overproduction

Who are the elites? In Turchin's model, they are individuals capable (but not necessarily required) to wield social power over others. In contemporary America, a person with a net worth of around one million dollars gains significant freedom in choosing how to spend their time and may even opt out of conventional employment. These individuals are protected from sudden financial setbacks and effectively have control over their lives. Those with less wealth lack this degree of power. Meanwhile, individuals with assets between $5 million and $10 million or more begin to exert power over other people.

Power can come from various sources—physical force, administrative authority, or the power of persuasion—but in the U.S., wealth has long been and remains the dominant factor. More than half of all U.S. presidents have been millionaires when adjusted for modern valuations, and every president before 1850 was among the wealthiest 1% of the population.

Turchin emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the elite—those already in power—and "elite aspirants," who are still striving to attain positions of influence. Once the link between wealth and power is established, it becomes clear that there are always multimillionaires and billionaires vying for political control. This creates a critical contradiction.

In 1983, there were only 66,000 ultra-wealthy households in the U.S. (with assets over $10 million, adjusted to 1995 dollars). By 2019, that number had increased to 693,000. Meanwhile, the overall number of households grew by only 53%, leading to a rise in the proportion of the ultra-wealthy from 0.08% to 0.54%. Over the same period, the number of political positions—seats in Congress, governorships, and, most notably, the presidency—remained unchanged. This means that competition for these roles has increased more than tenfold.

A similar pattern is seen in the field of education: the number of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral degrees awarded continues to rise, while the number of available jobs remains relatively static.

As a result, elite overproduction creates a vast pool of "losers"—people with the resources, connections, and skills but unable to secure their desired positions of power. Their dissatisfaction leads to attempts to change the system and erodes trust in state institutions, setting the stage for societal breakdown. The social pyramid has become top-heavy and unstable.

Popular Immiseration

Inhabitants of the "ivory tower" might argue that humanity has never been as wealthy and well-fed as it is today. This is likely true on a global scale, thanks in large part to China’s unprecedented success in reducing poverty. However, for many Americans, this assertion feels far removed from reality: today, they are living worse off than their predecessors 50 years ago.

The elite overproduction discussed earlier did not happen in isolation. It was made possible by the economic decline of the majority. While real wages grew steadily for two generations after the Great Depression, they have stagnated since the 1970s. For example, the median hourly wage in 1976 was $17.11, and by 2016 it had risen only slightly to $18.90. At first glance, this may not seem like a poor outcome, but a closer look reveals more.

First, consider dividing the workforce by education level: those without a high school diploma (9% of the population in 2016), with a high school diploma (26%), with some college (29%), with a bachelor's degree (23%), and those with advanced degrees (13%). Since 1976, the median wages for the top two groups have risen significantly, while those for the bottom three have declined. In other words, the quality of life has deteriorated for 64% of the population.

Second, we need to examine how inflation is calculated, as it directly affects the "real" wage figure (and let’s not overlook that inflation is determined by government agencies and is subject to manipulation). While some goods, such as cars, have become cheaper compared to the 1970s, education and healthcare costs have soared. In 1976, a median-wage worker needed to work 150 hours to pay for one year of college; by 2016, it required 500 hours. To purchase a median-priced home, the same worker in 2016 needed to work 40% more hours than in 1976.

Moreover, when comparing median wages to GDP per capita—a metric that indicates the share of economic output workers receive—it turns out that by 2010, this figure had halved. This reflects a "wealth pump" that redistributes income upward to the wealthy.

The impoverishment of most Americans is evident outside economic statistics as well. The average height of U.S.-born citizens increased throughout the 20th century but plateaued after 1960, whereas it continued to rise in other Western countries. In the 18th century, Americans were the tallest people in the world, but now Germans, Dutch, and Swedes have surpassed them.

Life expectancy at birth for white Americans fell by 1.6 years between 2014 and 2020, with the decline starting well before the pandemic. Among middle-aged white Americans without college degrees, there has been a rise in "deaths of despair"—from alcoholism, drug overdoses, and suicide. Surprisingly, the mortality rate for this group now exceeds that of the previous generation, despite medical advances.

Thus, a substantial portion of the population has legitimate reasons to feel dissatisfied with and see inherent unfairness in the current system.

Conclusion

The combination of elite overproduction and popular immiseration forms a volatile mix that has historically led to the collapse of many societies. Discontented elite aspirants rally dissatisfied masses to challenge and dismantle the existing order. A similar situation in the U.S. previously resulted in the Civil War.

History suggests that resolving such internal crises often involves a drastic reduction in the number of elites through various means—wars, revolutionary executions, exile, or voluntary emigration. What lies ahead for America? We will explore this in the next post.